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COMMENT
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF STATE
TAX CLAIMS
By Cauiis S. RUBY and KIuRT H. PYE*
e eFOR NO country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of an-
other," was the general rule laid down by Lord Mansfield in Holman
v. Johnson.1 There he held that an action might be maintained in
England for the price of tea sold and delivered in France even though
the plaintiff seller knew the buyer was going to smuggle the tea into
England in violation of English revenue laws. The rule was first ap-
plied in the United States in a similar commercial case,2 and later there
appeared a dictum that the rule might apply where one state at-
tempted to collect a tax due under its laws in the courts of a sister
state.3 The purpose of this comment is to discuss the rule of non-en-
forcement of sister state tax claims, the problems it has created, and
the solutions which have been and may be attempted.
Early Application of the Rule in the United States
Maryland v. Turner4 was the first of a long line of New York de-
cisions establishing the general rule of non-enforcement of sister state
tax claims.5 Maryland sought recovery of the personal property taxes
assessed against Turner while he was a resident of that State. Plaintiff
alleged that the Maryland courts had held that a tax assessment
created a duty to pay of a contractual nature and that the New York
* Members, Second Year Class.
11 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). An earlier English
case to the same effect was Boucher v. Lawson, Cases temp. Hardwicke 85, 95 Eng.
Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734).
2 Randall v. Rensselaer, 1 Johns. R. 94 (N.Y. 1806) (action on promisory note
executed in France without French revenue stamp affixed).
a Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332 (1843) (action for false imprisonment for
non-payment of taxes which were allegedly illegally assessed against plaintiff).
4 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
5 Accord, City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921)
(dictum, but most often cited for the rule); Wayne County v. American Steel Export
Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1950); Wayne County v. Foster & Reynolds
Co., 277 App. Div. 1105, 101 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1950); In re Buckley's Estate, 31 Misc. 2d
551, 220 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sur. Ct. 1961); In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N.Y.
Supp. 185 (Sur. Ct. 1923). It is apparently the Pennsylvania rule also, Ohio v. Flower,
59 Pa. D. & C. 14 (C.P. 1947); Hamilton County Treasurer v. Hartzell, 55 Pa. D. & C.
(C.P. 1945). Contra, J.A. Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50
S.E. 650 (1905).
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courts ihust consider the nature of the claim as established by the
Maryland interpretation. The New York court said that the test of
whether or not an action by a sister state was for a penal claim' was
to be made by the forum state, and Maryland's claim under a revenue
law was penal. As a penal claim it would not be enforced in a sister
state. The court also decided that it was not "bound by any rule of
comity to enforce the tax laws of Maryland."7
Moore v. Mitchell,8 a federal case arising in New York, denied en-
forcement of a tax claim brought by the treasurer of Grant County,
Indiana. In a concurring opinion,9 Judge Learned Hand attempted to
rationalize the rule of non-enforcement on the ground that to enforce
sister state tax laws the forum state would first have to inquire if they
were contrary to its public policy, investigating the relations of the
sister state with its citizens and perhaps embarrassing the sister state
with its findings. The logical criticism of this argument is that the sister
state in bringing the action has indicated it is willing to risk the embar-
rassment to collect the revenue.10 The Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision on another ground, avoiding a decision "whether a federal court
in one state will enforce the revenue laws of another, state.""
Tax judgments
The rule of non-enforcement originated in commercial cases where
one sovereign nation refused to indirectly enforce the revenue laws
of another. 2 One factor that has modified the application of the rule
in the United States is the full faith and credit's clause of the federal
constitution. The Supreme Court in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co.'4 held that where a tax claim has been reduced to judgment a sister
state must,' under the full faith and credit clause, allow an action on
the judgment in its courts. In this case the original claim was for in-
6 It is an accepted rule that foreign penal claims will not be enforced. See generally
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. RBv.
193 (1932).
775 Misc. at 13, 132 N.Y. Supp. at 175.
830 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930), 5 IND.
L.J. 625, 5 Wisc. L. BEv. 494.
9 id. at 603.
1OSee Note, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1946); Note, 18 CoRNuE. L.Q. 581,
586 (1933); Comment, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 796, 800 (1949).
" The Court held that the treasurer lacked capacity to sue in the federal courts of
another state, saying he "has no better standing to bring suits in courts outside Indiana
than have executors, administrators, or chancery receivers without title, appointed under
the laws and by the courts of that state." 281 U.S. at 24.
12See cases cited notes 1-3 supra.13 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
14296 U.S. 268 (1935), 49 HAnv. L. REv. 490 (1936), 20 Mn. L. Rzv. 431
(1936). Accord, New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., 112 N.J.L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (Ct. Err. &
App.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934).
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come taxes, and the Court said, "Even if the judgment is deemed to be
colored by the nature of the obligation whose validity it establishes
... still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory lia-
bility, quasi-contractual in nature.... "x The Court reasoned that no
policy of the forum state could have sufficient weight to overbalance
the interests of the taxing state and the policy of the full faith and
credit clause in enforcing judgments, but, as in Moore v. Mitchell, the
Court declined to decide the question "whether one state must enforce
the revenue laws of another....
The Problem of Tax Claims
Non-enforcement of tax claims remained the common law rule
without exception until State ex. rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rod-
gers. Oklahoma brought an action in Missouri to collect an income
tax obligation incurred by Rodgers and his wife while they were
residents of Oklahoma. In reversing a dismissal of the action, the
Missouri appellate court reviewed the early development of the gen-
eral rule of non-enforcement in cases' s not brought for the collection
of taxes and noted that the analogy to penal laws could not be main-
tained. There was no procedural difficulty, since the Oklahoma
statute 9 authorized the Tax Commission to sue for taxes in any court
of competent jurisdiction in the same manner as for the enforcement
of a debt. Missouri had no local public policy opposed to the imposi-
tion of an income tax.20 Possible inconvenience to the defendant in
conducting his defense outside the jurisdiction where the liability
arose was no greater than in any other transitory action and, in any
event, was brought about by the defendant's voluntary removal from
the taxing jurisdiction. If in future cases the forum found that the
taxing jurisdiction had its own local remedy it could refuse to allow
the action by applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.21 The
added expense to the forum state in allowing such actions in its courts
'5 296 U.S. at 271.
16 Id. at 275.
17238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946), 34 CALIw. L. REv. 754, 46 COLum
L. REv. 1013, 41 ILL. L. REv. 439, 31 MmNN. L. REv. 93, 25 TEXAs L. REv. 88. The one
earlier case which allowed enforcement did not clearly hold that state tax claims might
be enforced extraterritorially on principles of comity, J. A. Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill
Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905).
18 Cases cited notes 1-3 supra.
19 OxIA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1464 (1961).
20 238 Mo. App. at 1127, 193 S.W.2d at 926. Thus the application of the Oklahoma
statute was not contrary to the public policy of the forum.
21 "The rule of forum nonconveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretionary
power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of
action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly
tried elsewhere." Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944).
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would probably not be too burdensome. The court concluded that
the courts of Missouri would entertain actions for tax claims by other
states. "The simplest ideas of comity would seem to compel such a
result, and modern conditions demand it."
22
The reasoning of the Rodgers case is sound,23 but the courts which
have since considered the question of extending comity to sister state
tax claims are divided. Three jurisdictions have followed Rodgers. In
Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnet-2 4 the Kentucky court allowed Ohio to bring
an action for premiums owed for workmen's compensation insurance
regardless of whether it was for a tax claim or a contract claim.
Arkansas allowed an action by Oklahoma for an income tax claim in
Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely2 5 without applying
an Arkansas reciprocal comity statute26 which became effective after
the liability had accrued in Oklahoma and before suit was filed in
Arkansas. The court decided to adopt the Rodgers rule as the Arkansas
common law rule to be applied where the statute did not apply. City
of Detroit v. Gould 7 was an action to collect personal property taxes
from a resident of Illinois who had owned property while residing in
Detroit. Illinois allowed the action on principles of comity, reasoning
that since the defendant had enjoyed the protection of the laws of
Michigan for the period for which the tax was assessed he should be
held to pay the taxes as the cost of the protection.
California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. 2 8 was a case
decided by the Rodgers court which approved its earlier decision but
distinguished the case before it on the facts. The court held that the
California statute29 involved in this case created an exclusive remedy
in California for the collection of inheritance taxes. This decision is
open to question;30 it illustrates the risk of an unusual interpretation of
22 238 Mo. App. at 1128, 193 S.W.2d at 927.
2 3 ESTATE M.NT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 610, comment c (1934) took the position
that "No action can be maintained by a foreign state to enforce its license or revenue
laws, or claims for taxes." The Institute dropped this comment in BESTATEiMENT OF
TH LAW 174 (Supp. 1948), taking no stand on whether a foreign state could maintain
an action on a tax claim and stating that the Rodgers rule would be "more desirable" if
a stand were to be taken.
24314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950), 39 Ky. L.J. 472 (1951), 50 MxcE. L.
REv. 334 (1951), 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 517 (1951).
25 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150 (1955), 9 VAND. L. REv. 389 (1956).
2 6 An'. STAT. ANN. § 84-4018 (1960).
27 12 IMI. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957), 36 Car.-KENT L. REv. 71 (1959), 7
DE PAUL L. REv. 243 (1958).
28 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
348 U.S. 932 (1954).
29 CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 14651.
30 See Note, 1958 WAsH. U.L.Q. 283, 289. The situation was remedied when the
California legislature in 1953 passed CAr. REv. & TAX. CoDE § 14350 specifically




foreign taxing statutes by the forum state whenever one state seeks
to recover on a tax claim in the courts of another.
Yet the rule of non-enforcement retains some vitality. A trial court
decision in Pennsylvania3 subsequent to Rodgers followed an earlier
Pennsylvania decision 82 applying the rule. City of Detroit v. Proctor,33
a Delaware decision, took note of Rodgers but declined to follow it
and extend comity in the absence of express legislative mandate. The
New York court, originator of the rule of non-enforcement of sister
state tax claims, 4 has maintained its position. In the latest case, City
of Philadelphia v. Cohen,35 the New York Court of Appeals held that
Philadelphia could not bring an action in the New York courts on a
parking-lot tax claim. The court cited New York decisions as establish-
ing a rule that comity would not be extended to the enforcement of
foreign tax laws and approved the much criticized"6 "intrusion-into-
the-public-affairs-of-another-state" rationale for the rule. The Rodgers
case was not mentioned in the opinion. The New York court merely re-
peated its earlier stand on the question of comity.
The problem of enforcing tax claims was not effectively solved for
the taxing states by Rodgers, because there is no assurance that the
courts of the state where the action is brought will follow the Rodgers
rule. To effectively overcome the rule of non-enforcement, taxing
states need solutions which are not dependent on the view of public
policy and common law comity taken by the forum. There are three
approaches available: (1) application of the full faith and credit
clause; (2) enactment of statutes designed to expand the jurisdiction
of the taxing state courts; and (3) enactment of reciprocal comity
statutes.
Solutions Under Full Faith and Credit
The full faith and credit clause has its roots in the Articles of Con-
federation.3 7 The provision granted recognition of the rights crdated
3l Ohio v. Flower, 59 Pa. D. & C. 14 (C. P. 1947). The court did not cite Rodgers.
Pennsylvania has since adopted a reciprocal comity statute. PA. STAT. tit. -, §- (2
CCH PA. STATE TAx RP. ff 99-497 (Aug. 14, 1963)).
32 Hamilton County Treasurer v. Hartzell, 55 Pa. D. & C. 100 (C.P. 1945) (Ohio
county personal property taxes).
8344 Del. (5 Terry) 193, 61 A.2d 412 (Super. Ct. 1948) (action by city of
Detroit for personal property taxes), 4 ARm. L. REv. 86 (1949), 47 MicH. L. REv.
796 (1949).
84 See cases cited notes 4-5 supra.
85 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962), 29 BROOxLYN
L. REv. 315 (1963), 62 COLuTm. L. PaEv. 1526 (1962), 31 FoRDHAm L. PEv. 577
(1963), 61 MicH. L. REv. 374 (1962), 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1962).
36 See citations at note 10 supra.
87 "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts,
and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State." ATrcrmus
OF CoNFamAmxON art. IV.
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by the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magis-
trates of each state in all the other states. The clause was adopted into
the Constitution with the additional proviso that "the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, RecordsY. e"88
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. The first
Congress enacted legislation 9 which prescribed the effect only for
records and proceedings, providing that they be given the same effect
in all states. Fourteen years later Congress enacted another statute40
describing the manner of proving and the effect of judicial proceedings
and records, but again the effect of public acts was omitted. Finally,
in 1948, an amendment 4' to the statutes was enacted which codified
the Supreme Court interpretation that full faith and credit must be
accorded to "public acts."42 The scarcity of legislation under the clause
indicates that it is unlikely that Congress will declare the effect to be
given rights created under tax statutes.
In the absence of congressional action, emphasis must be given to
the judicial interpretation of the extent of the full faith and credit
clause and the statutes enacted to supplement it. In tax cases there is
usually a final determination of tax liability by an appropriate state
administrative body. Writers have agreed that there is nothing in the
clause or statutes to preclude giving full faith and credit to the tax
liability as determined by the state taxing authority on either of two
bases: the determination itself may be recognized as a "judicial pro-
ceeding" entitled to full faith and credit, or the rights created by a
state in favor of itself by a "public act,"43 the tax statute, may be given
full faith and credit. The Supreme Court has held that workmen's
compensation awards,4 4 when final, are entitled to full faith and credit
38 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. For a general discussion of "judicial proceedings" and
"public acts" see Sumner, The Status of Public Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1 (1955); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
441 (1954).
39 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
40 Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, g Stat. 298.
4128 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). See the discussion of the possible effect of the amend-
ment in Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 984 (1955).
42 1n Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-5 (1932) the Court
said, "That a statute is a 'public act' within the meaning of that clause is well settled."
This statement has been sustained through the years; the most recent case supporting
the broad statement is Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1954).
43 See generally Abel, Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and Credit,
22 IowA L. REv. 461 (1936); Daumn, Interstate Comity and Governmental Claims,
33 ITL. L. REv. 249 (1938); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1932); Sumner, The Status of Public Acts in Sister
States, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1 (1955).
44 In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) the Court held that
the determination, being entitled to full faith and credit as a judgment, was res judicata
so as to preclude any subsequent claims under another state's workmen's compensation
statute. A dissenting opinion by Justice Black, concurred in by three other Justices,
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as judgments. Yet in Broderick v. Rosner,45 involving a state bank super-
intendant's assessment of stockholder's liability, the Court declined to
consider whether this determination was entitled to full faith and
credit as a "judicial proceeding." The holding was that a statutory
right had been created and that this right must be accorded full faith
and credit. The distinction is important in tax cases. If the state deter-
muination of tax liability is brought under the full faith and credit
clause as a "judicial proceeding" there is. no necessity of interpreting
the tax statutes of a sister state to decide what rights are created under
those "public acts." Many state tax statutes provide that after a pre-
scribed method of notice and time limit the taxpayer's right to appeal
is waived and the clain is final on the merits.46 If the determination is
within the clause as a "judicial proceeding," then the taxpayer is re-
stricted to collateral defenses such as lack of jurisdiction to make the
determination of tax liability when an action is brought in a sister state.
Two cases have granted full faith and credit to an administratively
determined tax claim without distinguishing between the determina-
tion as a "judicial proceeding" and the claim as a right created by a
"public act." City of New York v. Shapiro47 held that a final admmistra-
tive determination of business and use tax liability under the city's
municipal code was entitled to full faith and credit. The court reasoned
that any distinction between giving credit to a tax judgment and giving
it to a final administrative determination on which a judgment could
be based was unsound.
In Ohio Dep't of Taxation v. Kleitch Bros.48 Ohio brought suit in
Michigan for highway use taxes. The Ohio tax statute49 provided for
assessment and notice to the taxpayer and for a period during which
appeal could be filed. If there was no appeal a certified copy of the
assessment was filed with the county clerk, who entered a copy in
the records of the county court. There was no requirement of personal
service on the defendant within the jurisdiction prior to the clerk's
entry of the copy in the record, where it became a final order to pay
took issue not with holding the determination entitled to full faith and credit as a
judgment but with making it res judicata so as to bar a second claim even though the
first award would be credited against the second. The holding of the Hunt case was
limited in Industrial Commssion of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1946) to
situations where the compensation statute expressly provides that the board's decision
is final for all matters which were or might have been presented to it. But the Hunt
decision is still authority for the statement that determinations of compensation boards
are entitled to full faith and credit as judgments. See Mike Hooks, Inc. v. Pena, 313
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1963); Chapman v. John St. John Drilling Co., 73 N.M. 261, 287
P.2d 462 (1963).
45294 U.S. 629 (1935).
46 One such provision is CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 6537.
47 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954), 69 HAnv. L. REv. 378 (1955).
48357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636 (1959).
49 Omo REV. Conz AmN. §§ 5728.02-.14 (Supp. 1962).
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taxes. The defendant claimed that the procedure was a denial of due
process. The Michigan court sustained Ohio's claim, stating that tax
proceedings to enforce payment were by their very nature summary
and customarily reduced to lien and execution without any "judicial
proceeding." The court concluded that a discussion of jurisdiction was
not necessary as the Ohio court did not adjudicate anything but was
merely the statutory place of record for a final order to pay taxes. The
order was held to have been made in accordance with the requirements
of due process and to be entitled to full faith and credit as a "record"
of Ohio entered in compliance with a "public act."
Though there is no direct Supreme Court authority, there would
appear to be no obstacle to extending full faith and credit to rights
created by taxing statutes.50 The only cases where statutory rights are
clearly not entitled to full faith and credit are where the statute is
penal5' or where the forum has a pertinent statute and a relation to
the case substantial enough to warrant the application of its own
statute.52 The Court in the White case stated there was no penal taint
to tax claims, 53 and obviously the forum would not have such a relation
to the sister state's tax claims as would justify application of its own tax
statutes to the claim. The argument that a sister state's statutes might
be contrary to the public policy of the forum has been so limited by
Supreme Court decisions that the "room left for play of conflicting
policies is a narrow one."54
Solutions Under Jurisdictional Statutes
Many states have enacted statutes which authorize service upon
the secretary of state or other designated person in actions arising out
of activities within the state brought against foreign corporations, non-
residents, or former residents. These statutes may be general in na-
ture,55 directed specifically to obligations owed to the state,55 or limited
50 In the most recent case the New York Court of Appeals found no binding prece-
dent requiring them to extend full faith and credit to an administrative determination of
tax liability, but an able dissent reasoned that the final determination had essentially
the same force and effect as a judgment and should be given full faith and credit as
either a "public act" or a "record." City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184
N.E.2d 167, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962).
51 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
52Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
53 See quotation accompanying note 15 supra.
S4 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935).
55See CAL. CoDE, Crv. Peoc. §§ 412, 413, 417 which provide for substituted
service by publication and mail on defendants absent from or not residents of the State.
56 See CAL. CODE Civ. Pxoc. § 1018 which directs every foreign corporation and
non-resident individual incurring a liability under any tax law of the State to appoint an
agent within the State to receive service of process. In the absence of such appointment
the Secretary of State may receive service. Notification of such service must then be
made to the corporation or individual.
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to specified types of activities. 7 Regardless of form, the purpose of
such statutes is to enable the state courts to render valid personal judg-
ments without personally serving the defendant within the state while
still affording the defendant sufficient notice to adequately prepare a
defense. The constitutionality of statutes of this nature is well settled.58
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,59 a Washington statute
imposed an unemployment compensation tax upon wages paid by an
employer and collection was authorized through suits instituted by
substituted service. The Court in sustaining the judgment based on
substituted service held that there must be minimum contacts with the
state of such "quality and nature" that subjecting the corporation to
substituted service is "reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice. . . "60 Statutes of the
type held valid in this case can clearly reduce the magnitude of the
problem of extraterritorial collection of state taxes. If a state can get
a tax judgment against a nonresident corporation or individual through
substituted service, it can enforce the judgment in any state under the
doctrine of the White case.61
Solutions Under Reciprocal Comity Statutes
Reciprocal comity statutes are another practical solution state legis-
latures have worked out for the problem of extraterritorial enforce-
ment of tax claims. These statutes provide that the courts of the forum
state shall allow an action on a tax claim by any state or any political
subdivision of any state which extends a like comity. The number of
such statutes is large.62 However, there are difficulties even if a forum
5 7 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956) which authorizes service of process
upon the person outside the State on any person who personally or through an agent
transacts business, commits a tortious act, owns any interest in real property, or con-
tracts to insure any risk within the State.
5SMilliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (service on domiciliary outside juris-
diction); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (service on agent
of foreign corporation); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (service on secretary
of state for non-resident motorist).
59 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6o Id. at 320.
61 See case cited at note 14 supra.
62 The following are reciprocal comity statutes applicable generally to sister state
tax claims. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 914 (1958); ALA.sEA STAT. § 43.10.070 (1962); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 84-4018 (1960); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 30; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. -,
§ - (CCH DEL. STATE TAx REP. I[ 91705 (January, 1964)); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-8448
(1961); HAwMI REv. LAws § 115-31 (1955); ImAo CODE ANN. § 63-3408 (Supp.
1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-4201 (1961); IowA CODE ANN. ch. 421, § - (Legislative
Service No. 4, p. 336, 1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2910a (Supp. 1961); KY.
BEv. STAT. §§ 131.230, 135.190 (1960); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 3 (1952);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 16, § 54 (1954); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 81, § 127 (1957);
Micir. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2915 (1962); MIEN. STAT. ANN. § 272.58 (Supp. 1963);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9940-02 (Supp. 1962); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80:51 (1955); N.Y.
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state has a statute. If the taxing state has not given positive evidence
of a reciprocal extension of comity the forum state may reject its
claim.68 Again the tax statute is open to unusual interpretations yield-
ing results unfavorable to the taxing state. There are additional prob-
lems involving the statute of limitations64 and the collection of penalties
on the tax.6r And there is the final problem that as yet all states do not
have such statutes, and thus there are some jurisdictions where a tax-
ing state may still not bring suit on its tax claims.
Solution in California
The California Attorney General is empowered to collect taxes due
the State in other state courts. 66 The State also opens its courts to suits
for collection of taxes by states which extend a reciprocal comity.67 A
recent statutory provision 68 gives the Attorney General the additional
power of foreclosing liens in sister state and federal courts.69 But most
tax statutes are summary in nature and the tax claim is reduced to a
lien under the summary procedure.7 0 Thus the new provision is of
little practical importance to the collection of taxes out of state, for
unless comity is afforded by the forum state the foreclosure of a tax
lien will not be allowed for the same reasons applied to the non-
enforcement of the tax claim itself.
The California Attorney General has the opportunity of reducing
the tax claim to a judgment despite the absence of the defendant from
the State, and this judgment can be enforced under the doctrine of the
TAx LAw § 902; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-268 (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-09-01.1
(Supp. 1963); Ouxo REv. CODE ANN. § 5719.08.1 (Supp. 1962); OnA. STAT. tit. 68,
§ 1483 (1961); Oa. REv. STAT. § 305.610 (1963); PA. STAT. tit. -, § - (2 CCH PA.
STATE TAX REP.. It 99-497 (Aug. 14, 1963)); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-7.2 (Supp. 1963);
S.D. CODE § 57.1029 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1709 (1955); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-20b (1958); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.140 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 999(50oo) (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.47 (1957). Other states have statutes
applicable only to specific types of taxes, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:8A-46 (Supp. 1963)
(commuters' income tax); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 20.17 (Supp. 1963) (sales
and use tax). For a case applying a reciprocal comity statute see Oklahoma ex tel.
Oklahoma Tax Conm'n v. H. D. Lee Co., 174 Kan. 114, 254 P.2d 291 (1953).
6 City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 934 (1962). Contra, Ohio ex tel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d
722 (1950).
64 See Oklahoma ex tel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d
150 (1955).
65 See Oklahoma ex tel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. H. D. Lee Co., 174 Kan. 114,
254 P.2d 291 (1953).
66 CAL. REv. & TAX. CoDE § 31.
67 CAL. REv. & TAx. CoDE § 30.
6 Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1308.
69 See 38 CAL. S. BAR. J. 653 (1963).
70 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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White case. This procedure is permitted by a statute 1 authorizing
service of process upon the Secretary of State for any individual or cor-
poration having incurred a tax or other liability to the State, but no
longer living within the State.
Thus California has available the two solutions possible by state
legislative action. In practice, claims for California tax liabilities are
reduced to judgment under the substituted service statute rather than
by reliance upon an extension of comity by the state where the de-
fendant can be found.72
Conclusions
The rule of non-enforcement of sister state tax claims can no longer
be defended. The better view is to judicially extend comity to sister
state tax claims, and, failing this, a statutory extension of comity to
such claims on a reciprocal basis can alleviate the problem. It would
seem to be a logical extension of the trend of Supreme Court decisions
to require that full faith and credit be given to rights created under tax
statutes in favor of the taxing state. But under both the comity and full
faith and credit approaches the taxing state's statutes will be open to
unfavorable interpretation by the courts of the forum state. Moreover,
these solutions depend upon the willingness of the forum or the
Supreme Court to declare a rule favorable to the taxing state. A solu-
tion should be provided by the taxing state to operate in its favor
regardless of the view of the state where the tax evader is found. Under
statutes expanding the jurisdiction of state courts to render valid per-
sonal judgments after substituted service, tax claims against corpora-
tions or individuals residing in other states can be reduced to judgment
in the courts of the taxing state. This judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit in an action in another state under White. Thus substituted
service statutes for expanding jurisdiction seem to be the most effec-
tive method of solving the problem presented by the outmoded rule
of non-enforcement of sister state tax claims.
71 CL. CODE Crw. Paoc. § 1018.
7 2 Interview with Mr. Ernest Goodman, Deputy Attorney Genera], San Francisco,
California, October, 1963.
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